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Some versions of empiricism have been accused of being neither empirically confirmable nor analytically true and therefore meaningless or unknowable by their own lights. Carnap, and more recently van Fraassen, have responded to this objection by construing empiricism as a stance containing non-cognitive attitudes. The resulting stance empiricism is not subject to the norms of knowledge, and so does not selfdefeat as per the objection. In response to this proposal, several philosophers have argued that if empiricism is a stance, then there can be no distinctively epistemic reasons in favor of adopting it, but only prudential or moral reasons. I defend stance empiricism against this objection by showing that stance empiricism furthers many plausibly epistemic goals, such as false belief avoidance, wisdom, and justification. I respond to three objections to my argument: that I assume a conception of epistemic reason that leads to problematic tradeoffs (I do not), that to have epistemic reason is just to be epistemically justified (it is not), and that my premise that experience is the only source of information has no empirical content (it does).
1. Introduction
Empiricism has traditionally been understood as a thesis to the effect that (synthetic) claims must be appropriately based on experience if they are to be meaningful or epistemically justified. An influential objection to traditional empiricism points out that it does not live up to its own standards—that the empiricist thesis (or pseudo-thesis) is meaningless or epistemically unjustifiable by its own lights. One of Carnap’s major philosophical contributions was his suggestion that empiricism be construed not as a thesis, but instead as the (non-cognitive) proposal to use only empirically meaningful language. Understood in this way, empiricism would not be subject to the norms of knowledge or belief, and so would not self-defeat. It would however, be a proposal concerning language, and for this reason, would be unpalatable or even unintelligible to empiricists who reject Carnap’s distinction between empirically meaningful and meaningless language. Van Fraassen (1995; 2002) is one such empiricist. But he points out that the non-cognitive construal of empiricism per se is not wedded to Carnap’s linguistic approach, and offers a different, partially non-cognitive construal. Van Fraassen thus highlights the variety of what he calls empiricist stances, i.e., combinations of cognitive and non-cognitive states that embody an empiricist orientation.
One of the most common objections to emerge from the ensuing discussion of “stance empiricism” holds that the adoption of a stance cannot be epistemically right or wrong, is a matter of values as opposed to facts, and is therefore “relativistic” (Chakravartty 2011) or akin to a “lifestyle choice” (Ho 2007). What follows is a defense of stance empiricism against this objection. At least some stance empiricists, I will suggest, are in a position to argue that adopting stance empiricism is highly likely to contribute to our epistemic goals by, e.g., making our beliefs on the whole truer or more epistemically justified, making us wiser, or increasing our understanding; and that such contributions are specifically epistemic reasons to adopt the stance. This will be my teleological argument that there are epistemic reasons for stance empiricism.
Sections 2-5 summarize the background to my arguments. I lay out the teleological argument in sections 6 and 7. I then respond to three major objections in sections 8-10. The first (section 8) says that the teleological argument presupposes putative epistemic goals whose pursuit would license problematic epistemic tradeoffs. I show that it presupposes no such thing. The second objection (section 9) claims that certain hypothetical cases are best accounted for by restricting epistemic reason to cognitive states that can be epistemically justified. I respond that the cases are better accounted for by a conception of epistemic reason that extends to stances. The third objection (section 10) is van Fraassen’s (1995) rejection of the thesis that experience is the only source of information as empirically meaningless. I argue that van Fraassen’s objection to the thesis relies on a thought experiment that, once revised, establishes the empirical meaningfulness of the thesis.
Before I get into the arguments, I want to state up front some of the main assumptions I will be taking for granted and some limitations of what I hope to accomplish. I will not try to address all possible objections to empiricism.​[1]​ I will more or less assume that perception delivers information to human cognitive centers; that contemporary biology and psychology suggest that experience is the only signal from the external world to human cognition; and that coherence and incoherence with well confirmed scientific theories are good reasons for and against believing a given proposition, respectively. Finally, I will not try to show that stance empiricism is all things considered the best empiricist response to self-defeat objections. In particular, I will not argue that it is preferable to naturalistic analyses of empiricist epistemological positions.​[2]​ Many of the claims I take for granted have been argued for, and many of the objections I ignore have been addressed, by others. I will sometimes refer to the relevant arguments and sometimes fill in some gaps, but I will not adjudicate the debates surrounding them. Rather, in those contexts, I take the empiricist positions to be promising enough to justify exploring the possibilities that their success would open up.

2. Objections to Empiricism: Self-Defeat and van Fraassen’s Reductio
Consider the thesis
[ET] A synthetic sentence is truth-apt if and only if it is empirically significant—if and only if, that is, it makes a “difference for the prediction of an observable event” (Carnap 1956a, 49).
An objection to ET is that it is not empirically significant. Therefore, if it is synthetic, it is not truth-apt. And it is not plausibly an analytic truth deriving from the meaning of ‘truth-apt’. So ET is not truth-apt.
Or consider
[EK] All contingent propositions are knowable only on the basis of experience (Steup 2011, 19).
EK is not knowable on the basis of experience. Therefore, EK is not a contingent proposition. But neither is it a necessary proposition.​[3]​ So it is not a proposition at all; it is a sentence whose grammatical form deceives us into thinking it expresses propositional content. Steup (2011) discusses an analogous objection to the thesis that all contingent propositions are justifiable only on the basis of experience.
	These kinds of self-defeat objections are old hat. One is discussed, e.g., in Carnap (1935, section 7). Of more recent vintage is van Fraassen’s (1995; 2002) reductio ad absurdum of what he calls naïve empiricism. The latter is composed of the theses
[E+] Experience is the one and only source of information. (van Fraassen 2002, 43)
[NE] To be an empiricist = to believe that E+. (van Fraassen 2002, 42)
(The objection should apply equally to the result of replacing E+ with ET or EK.)
E+ is van Fraassen’s rendering of Quine’s thesis that “our information about the world comes only through impacts on our sensory receptors”, which, Quine tells us, “is a finding of the natural sciences” (1992, 19). Neither author elaborates on the concept of information in play or on the thesis’ scientific credentials.​[4]​ A brief, admittedly incomplete digression on this subject will therefore be useful. I take Quine to have in mind something like Dretske’s notion of informational content, where a “signal r carries the information that s is F = The conditional probability of s’s being F, given r (and [the agent’s background knowledge] k), is 1 (but, given k alone, less than 1)” (Dretske 1981, 65). This notion lends itself to Barwise and Seligman’s 
First Principle of Information Flow: Information flow results from regularities in a distributed system. (1997, 8)
A distributed system, here, is just a system that can be divided into parts. To use Barwise and Seligman’s example, a flashlight is a distributed system in virtue of its being divisible into its bulb, battery, switch, etc. Information flows from the flashlight to a perceiver due to the regular correlation between emission of light and the switch’s being in the “on” position. E+’s notion of information is therefore a naturalistic one that should be acceptable to empiricists.
What about the claim that experience is the only information-carrying signal? The claim contains two conjuncts: that experience is an information-carrying signal and that it is the only such signal. I take it that current scientific thinking about human sensation supports the first conjunct, for it seems to tell us that experience correlates regularly with many environmental processes. Furthermore, evolutionary biology explains the development of reliable sense perception in humans. For example, the development of color vision likely made our distant ancestors fitter by helping them reliably pick out nourishing food (Sumner & Mollon 2000; Párraga, Troscianko, & Tolhurst 2002). Peacocke (2004) gives an evolutionary explanation of human perception’s reliability in general.
E+’s second conjunct says that experience is the only such signal coming from the world. Quine (1992, 19) means for this to exclude telepathy as a carrier of information. Of more philosophical significance is a priori intuition as ground for theorizing. Intuitions are variously taken to be beliefs (Lewis 1983), dispositions to believe (van Inwagen 1997), or states in which propositions seem to one to be true (Bealer 1992). An intuition is a priori, in the relevant sense, just in case it is logically independent of any possible empirical proposition.
The second conjunct of E+ is intended to exclude all three types of a priori intuition from the class of informative mental states. Why does Quine think this exclusion scientifically legitimate? I take Quine’s thought to be that our theory of the human organism and its interaction with the environment is reasonably complete and leaves no room for any regular correlation between a priori intuition and mind-independent facts. We have extensively explored the human brain and found no connection between it and the contents of a priori intuitions. If such extensive exploration does not turn up a connection between intuition and world, then we should conclude that there is no such connection. Nor do we have any evolutionary explanation, of the kind available for the reliability of sense-perception, of how the human brain might have evolved to track facts through a priori intuitions. For these two reasons—lack of an observed connection and lack of an etiological explanation—a putative intuition-world correlation would “dangle nomologically” (Feigl 1967) from our total scientific theory. Finally, absent a plausible connection or explanation of a correlation between a priori intuition and mind-independent facts, we should conclude that the two are not correlated. So from Barwise and Seligman’s (1997) First Principle of Information Flow, a priori intuitions are not informative signals from the world. This sketch of the argument is rough and admittedly less than decisive. Nonetheless, I hope that it at least clarifies and motivates E+.
End of digression; I return now to van Fraassen’s objection to naïve empiricism. The latter includes, in addition to E+, the following theses:
[Corollary to NE] Empiricist critique of X = demonstration that X is incompatible with (contrary to) the empiricist dogma E+. (van Fraassen 2002, 43)
[(c)] As in science, so in philosophy: disagreement with any admissible factual hypothesis is admissible. (van Fraassen 2002, 43)
If E+ is meaningful at all, it is contingent and therefore, van Fraassen maintains, factual. From this together with (c), it follows that contraries to E+ are admissible. On the other hand, from the corollary to NE, contraries to E+ are subject to empiricist critique, where such critique has as its conclusion the inadmissibility of its target. So the naïve empiricist is committed to regarding contraries to E+ as simultaneously admissible and inadmissible. Van Fraassen pins the contradiction on NE’s identification of empiricism with a belief. He then proposes stance empiricism as an alternative.

3. Jauernig’s Objection to van Fraassen’s Reductio
Before moving on to van Fraassen’s stance empiricism, I want to get clear on what exactly is wrong with NE. Jauernig (2007) argues persuasively that the naïve empiricist can avoid van Fraassen’s reductio through a plausible modification of (c). As Jauernig points out,
in science the tolerance of rival hypotheses doesn’t extend to any factual hypothesis whatsoever, but only to factual hypotheses that meet certain standards. The most prominent standard in empiricist eyes is that it must be possible, at least in principle, empirically to investigate the hypothesis in question. (Jauernig 2007, 277)
The empiricist should therefore replace (c) with
[(c*)] as in science so in philosophy: any hypothesis that can in principle be empirically investigated is admissible as long as it has not been ruled out by the available empirical evidence, and only hypotheses that can in principle be empirically investigated are admissible. (Jauernig 2007, 278)
The resulting version of naïve empiricism can avoid van Fraassen’s reductio by rightly denying that (c*) implies the admissibility of contraries to E+. (The shift to (c*) also establishes a different set of relationships between the various theses: the naïve empiricist’s critique of rationalism will now consist, ultimately, in showing that (c*) rules them inadmissible, with E+ providing the reason to accept (c*) (Jauernig 2007, 278). The “teleological argument” I give below uses E+ similarly.) 
	But while naïve empiricism thus avoids van Fraassen’s reductio, a traditional self-defeat objection still looms: (c*) cannot be empirically investigated and is therefore inadmissible by its own lights. 

4. Stance Empiricism
Carnap introduced a novel strategy for dealing with self-defeat objections to empiricism: construe empiricism as a non-cognitive proposal whose lack of a truth-value does not count against it. According to Carnap, what look like straightforward assertions of empiricism are in fact ambiguous between non-cognitive proposals to use languages for science that meet certain empiricist conditions and cognitive descriptions of such languages. Such a Carnapian empiricist language is a deductively systematized and semantically interpreted regimentation of scientific theory. Its descriptive vocabulary is divided into disjoint classes of observation and theoretical terms and it is typically an artificial, symbolic language. Carnap characterized the empiricist languages for science by means of his criterion of cognitive significance: they were to be the languages whose vocabularies contain only terms that are either logical or appropriately connected to observation statements.​[5]​ For Carnap, a question about the relation between significance criteria and meaningfulness
has to be construed and formulated in a way different from that in which it is usually done. In the first place we have to notice that this problem concerns the structure of language…. Hence a clear formulation of the question involves reference to a certain language. Such a reference once made, we must above all distinguish between two main kinds of questions about meaningfulness; to the first kind belong the questions referring to a historically given language-system, to the second kind those referring to a language-system which is yet to be constructed. A question of the first kind is a theoretical one; it asks, what is the actual state of affairs; and the answer is either true or false. The second question is a practical one; it asks, how shall we proceed; and the answer is not an assertion but a proposal or decision. (1937, 3)
Philosophical claims along the lines of EK are, on this view, to be understood as answers to the second kind of question, i.e., as proposals or decisions to construct and use only empiricist languages in the context of cognitive inquiry:
it is preferable to formulate the principle of empiricism not in the form of an assertion—“all knowledge is empirical” or “all synthetic sentences that we can know are based on (or connected with) experiences” or the like—but rather in the form of a proposal or requirement. As empiricists, we require the language of science to be restricted in a certain way; we require that descriptive predicates and hence synthetic sentences are not to be admitted unless they have some connection with possible observations, a connection which has to be characterized in a suitable way. (Carnap 1937, 33)
This practical, non-cognitive construal gets empiricism out of its self-defeating bind. Such practical proposals or decisions lack truth-values. However, a lack of a truth-value does not undermine a non-cognitive proposal as it does theses like ET, EK, or (c*); non-cognitive attitudes and acts do not aspire to truth or knowledge.
	Carnap’s non-cognitive construal of empiricism is a proposal to use certain languages. It will not, therefore, appeal to empiricists like van Fraassen, who reject syntactic conceptions of science. Most fundamentally, van Fraassen (1980, 53-56) rejects the notion of an observation predicate that is essential to Carnap’s account of cognitive significance and thus to his notion of an empiricist language. Two further reasons for van Fraassen’s dissatisfaction with Carnap’s linguistic conception are the latter’s commitment to the analytic/synthetic distinction (van Fraassen 1995, 84-85) and putative identification of intelligibility with some single language’s expressive powers (van Fraassen 1995, 86).
But as van Fraassen (1995; 2002) points out, Carnap’s insight can be taken more broadly as the strategy of addressing self-defeat objections by construing empiricism as non-cognitive. Thus van Fraassen proposes that empiricism be understood as a stance, i.e., as a cluster of mental states, some of which will be non-cognitive, or in van Fraassen’s terminology, values, that need not concern language specifically or primarily. Van Fraassen’s preferred version of empiricism is a stance that involves “rejection of explanation demands and dissatisfaction with and disvaluing of explanation by postulate” and that is exhibited by
empiricists’ calling us back to experience, their rebellion against theory, their ideals of epistemic rationality, what they regard as having significance, their admiration for science, and the virtue they see in an idea of rationality that does not bar disagreement. (van Fraassen 2002, 47)
	Of course, not just any arbitrary grouping of mental states—my desire for a peanut butter sandwich and my belief that 2+2 = 4, e.g.—counts as a stance. Lipton refers to stances as “epistemic policies” (2004, 148). Now a policy is “a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions” (Merriam-Webster, 2017). To say that stances are epistemic policies, then, is just to say that they are epistemic rules, where a rule is epistemic for an agent when it functions for her to govern belief revision or inquiry. I intend this notion of a rule to be broad: it is to encompass, among other things, inference rules, axioms, definitions, assignments of salience to research questions, and determinations of which terms are reckoned meaningful. The “function” of a rule for a given agent is determined by the same kinds of things as the function of an instrument, viz., the rule follower’s attitudes, actual or counterfactual, towards it. This last aspect of my account is drawn from Carnap, who conceives of languages for science as instruments (Carnap 1943, viii; Carnap 1956c, 43). There is more to say about these notions of rules and functioning, and, admittedly, greater precision to be sought. But I leave it for another occasion.
This account of a stance aligns with several others. I just derived it from Lipton’s (2004) by substitution of synonyms. It is also equivalent to Baumann’s conception of “epistemic stances” (2011, 30), with which it shares a concern with teleology: for Baumann, a stance is epistemic just in case it is “adopted with respect to” an activity whose “main inherent telos is… epistemic in nature” (2011, 30). Boucher characterizes stances as “ways of seeing facts” (2014, 2319), which “suggest questions and lines of inquiry, illuminate important, heretofore neglected or underappreciated issues, indicate connections between apparently disparate phenomena, and help us approach old problems in constructive new ways” (2014, 2323). To take one of these examples, a stance suggests questions as epistemically salient by including a rule of the form: given the existing data and accepted natural laws, such-and-such question is epistemically salient.
Central aspects of van Fraassen’s empirical stance, like rejection of inference to the best explanation and of explanation by posit, are straightforwardly rejections of epistemic rules. Admiration for science, another component of the empirical stance, has different functions for different individuals. For some, it might just rationalize sneering at the overly credulous or provide a feeling of awe and so fail to count as a rule functioning to guide inquiry. For others, it might be a kind of “meta-rule” regulating the acceptance of rules: if inference to the best explanation, e.g., is found to be scientific, then an admiration for science will militate in favor of its acceptance. In the latter case, admiration for science functions to regulate belief, if through the mediation of other stances, and so counts as a stance (or as part of one).
There are various stances that merit the label ‘empiricist’. While the most famous are Carnap’s and van Fraassen’s, there are no doubt others, some of which yet to be developed. My primary concern will not be with any particular such stance. Rather, I will defend the construal of empiricism as a stance per se—I will defend what I call stance empiricism.

5. The Epistemic Arationality Objection to Stance Empiricism
One of the most common objections to stance empiricism holds that it makes empiricism relevantly similar to personal values (Chakravartty 2011, 41), religions, or lifestyles (Ho 2007, 330). In short, the objection is that stance empiricism is epistemically arational​[6]​ in the sense of being immune to epistemic reason. If stance empiricism is as this objection claims, then its advocates would be in no position to criticize supposedly epistemically inferior kinds of belief, like superstition, pseudo-science, or intuition-mongering in philosophy. Furthermore, it might, as Baumann argues, be Moore-paradoxical to consider oneself to be an empiricist while accepting that one has no “epistemic reason to be” (2011, 30).
There are a few different versions of this argument. One infers the arationality of stances more or less directly from their being non-cognitive values. In this vein, Ho (2007, 330) contends that if disagreement about stances is a disagreement about values, then “appeal to factual claims cannot rationally persuade someone to change her stance”. Similarly, according to Lipton, “the stance empiricist denies [that one’s stance is epistemically obligatory] but aims rather to show the [stance] to be the most attractive option relative to one’s values” (2004, 151). We would therefore be able to take up whichever stance would suit our values without risk of epistemic irrationality. By contrast, there may be epistemic reasons for or against accepting theses or doctrines, and these reasons will generally not be sensitive to our values. 
Jauernig (2007) argues on similar grounds that stance empiricism cannot give a genuine “critique” of rationalism (or “metaphysics”). She defines a critique of x as effective just in case it builds a case against x on values and facts that are accepted by the relevant conversational participants. For example, if you argue, soundly, that factory farming is wrong by demonstrating that it causes more pain than pleasure, and if the context is a discussion between hedonistic utilitarians, then you effectively critique the thesis that factory farming is morally permissible. Sometimes interlocutors’ views will diverge to the point of precluding any effective critique. In some of these cases, an objection can “still be recognized as a critique, although not an effective one” (Jauernig 2007, 294), provided the objection involves an accusation of factual mistake. Since, according to Jauernig, the dispute between the stance empiricist and the metaphysician does not primarily concern a factual matter, the stance empiricist cannot give even an ineffective critique—she cannot regard the metaphysician’s eschewal of stance empiricism as a mistake at all.
Jauernig’s argument concerns consistency with the facts, as opposed to epistemic reason, and so is not, strictly speaking, an arationality argument. But it is similar enough because it derives stances’ immunity to factual critique from their being matters of value. Moreover, it stands and falls with the arationality argument: the stance empiricist does not need to claim that eschewing her stance in and of itself misrepresents the facts; its being an epistemic mistake, i.e., contrary to epistemic reason, suffices. And, as I argue below, it can be the latter without being the former.
Chakravartty (2004) gives yet another version of the argument. His strategy is to argue that even the concept of epistemic rationality that stands the best chance of applying to stances cannot do so. I call this concept epistemic rationality by proxy, where a stance is rational in this sense to the extent that it generates or endorses epistemically rational beliefs.​[7]​ Chakravartty points out that stances yield beliefs via the mediation of other, background beliefs. For example, van Fraassen’s empirical stance per se does not give much if any guidance about what to believe, though given an observational record, it would tell us to believe the contents of this record and, perhaps, observational claims obtained from it by induction. For Chakravartty, this dependence on background belief means that stances are not “intrinsically” (2004, 180) rational or irrational. And from this he infers that there is “no definitive answer to the question of whether a stance is rationally permissible” (2004, 180).
It is important to distinguish two readings of Chakravartty’s conclusion. On the first, stances are neither definitely rational nor irrational simpliciter. Here, rationality is treated as a monadic property and the argument is that stances’ dependence on background beliefs for yielding a set of endorsed beliefs prevents their instantiating this property. Interpreted in this way, the conclusion is surely true, but it is also toothless: virtually nothing is rational or irrational considered in abstraction from an agent and her beliefs. The belief that the earth is round is rational for me, but only given my accumulated testimonial evidence. The same belief was irrational for Abraham, who possessed different evidence. On the second interpretation of Chakravartty’s conclusion, rationality is understood to be a relation between stances, agents, and background beliefs, and the claim is that this relation does not definitely subsist for any such triples. This interpretation would give the conclusion some bite, but it also renders the argument invalid: from the fact that rationality is a relation between stances, agents, and beliefs, it does not follow that the relation does not “definitively” apply to triples of this kind. As I concede below, stance empiricism might be rational for agents who believe E+, but not for those who do not. This possibility does not render its rationality for the first group less definite.
A final elaboration of the arationality argument, given by Boucher (2014), relies on intuitions about hypothetical examples to motivate the thesis that “[e]ven if the benefits of stances are epistemic, we are still dealing with pragmatic justification inasmuch as the stance is justified in terms of the benefits of adopting it” (Boucher 2014, 2319). I respond to this argument in section 9. Provisionally, I assume that we have epistemic reason to do that which would advance our epistemic goals.
Van Fraassen defends stance empiricism by accusing the arationality argument, in its various formulations, of being “governed by a simplistic dichotomy” (2007, 375) between fact- and value-based disagreement. While van Fraassen accepts the Humean distinction between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ statements (2007, 377), and along with it, one would think, a distinction between facts and values, he denies that this distinction grounds a corresponding one between kinds of disagreement. Rather, he maintains that fact- and value-based arguments alike are successful in so far as the one party appeals to the other’s presuppositions, and furthermore, that empiricists and rationalists are likely to share enough values for arguments based on such appeals to be successful in this sense. He offers an example of such an empiricist critique of metaphysics:
[l]ook, the empiricist says to a given metaphysician, how your basic principles concerning substance, causality, and interaction have led you into fruitless hidden-variable mongering. The metaphysician stares helplessly at the mess, and suddenly recognizes a value that s/he has held all along, about what brings valuable understanding and what does not. (van Fraassen 2007, 377)
So van Fraassen does not deny that stances are epistemically arational. But he denies that this is a problem. In his view, the possibility of debate on the basis of shared values provides a model of stance disagreement that is adequate for empiricist purposes.
This response has two shortcomings. First, if values are understood non-cognitively, then mere persuasion based on shared values is not adequate for empiricist purposes—it does not accord with empiricist values. As Ho might point out, empiricism might inspire awe in two agents; appeals to this feeling are plainly not the right kind of argument for a stance like empiricism. Second, van Fraassen has not identified the values that are ostensibly shared by empiricists and metaphysicians, or even given us reason to think there are any.
Like van Fraassen, Carnap likely would have bitten the bullet on the arationality argument. Carnap seems to assume that once empiricism is construed as a proposal, it becomes a “practical”, as opposed to a “theoretical” matter (1937, 3), where this contrast seems to come to the same as that between the practical and the epistemic.​[8]​ He articulates this view in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, where he argues that the existence of a kind of entity (properties, propositions, numbers, space-time points)
is not a theoretical question but rather the practical question whether or not to accept those linguistic forms [i.e., variables ranging over entities of this kind]. This acceptance is not in need of a theoretical justification (except with respect to expediency and fruitfulness), because it does not imply a belief or assertion. (Carnap 1956b, 218)

6. The Teleological Argument For Stance Empiricism
Unlike Carnap and van Fraassen, who accept the arationality argument but endorse stance empiricism all the same, I reject the arationality argument’s inference from stances’ being values to their being arational. As the following teleological argument shows, stance empiricism enjoys the support of epistemic reasons despite being non-cognitive.
E1.	Our evidence on balance supports E+, i.e., the thesis that experience is the one and only informative signal from the world.
E2.	If E1, then a stance that licenses non-empirical beliefs is likely to hinder pursuit of an epistemic goal more than a stance that licenses only empirical beliefs.
E3.	Rationalism licenses non-empirical beliefs whereas stance empiricism does not.
E4.	Therefore, rationalism is likely, given our evidence, to hinder pursuit of an epistemic goal more than stance empiricism.
E5.	Therefore, there is prima facie epistemic reason to take up stance empiricism instead of rationalism.
Some clarifications and elaborations. It is important to emphasize that E+ is intended to be a naturalistic, non-normative thesis. Were information understood normatively, as that on which we should base our beliefs, then the argument would beg the question against rationalists. Above, I gestured towards a conception of information that may fit this bill.​[9]​
The empiricist will have to specify the receiver of the information of which experience is said to be the only signal. In a sense, heredity conveys information, which is contained in DNA, from the external world (specifically, the agent’s parents) to the agent’s brain. But heredity is not, of course, a kind of experience.​[10]​ The reason the empiricist does not regard heredity as a signal to the relevant receiver, though, is that it does not make one’s genetic information available for cognition, even if it is contained in or grounds one’s cognition. To, e.g., reason on the basis of one’s DNA containing such-and-such genetic information, one would need to discover perceptually, through laboratory experiments, that one’s DNA contains such-and-such genetic information. The empiricist thus means by E+ that experience is cognition’s one and only information-carrying signal from the external world.​[11]​
The idea behind E2 is that E+ suggests that beliefs with no empirical support are likely to concern things about which we have no information (if they concern anything at all). And, in general, if we have no information about something, then any belief about it is overwhelmingly likely to be false or nonsensical. (To simplify the discussion, I will confine myself to the case of false beliefs.) For example, if I know nothing about the layout, history, or culture of a city I am visiting; and if I have no testimony about its streets; and if I come to believe that the mayor’s office is on LeMarchant Street, this belief is overwhelmingly likely to be false. From the empiricist’s perspective, theses based only on a priori intuitions are in the same way stabs in the dark. 
Furthermore, suppose for the moment that we cognizers have the epistemic goals of, perhaps among other things, believing truths and not believing falsehoods (James 1907, 17).​[12]​ (I relax this assumption below.) If what I said in the previous paragraph is right, then, rationalism is likely to hinder and stance empiricism is likely to advance the epistemic goal of avoiding false beliefs.
What does it mean for something to be an epistemic goal? The account I find most plausible is Feldman’s (2000) grounding of epistemic goals in our cognitive role. As Feldman points out, most of us play a variety of roles—e.g., teacher, parent, cyclist—and must do certain things in order to play them well. These are the “role oughts” to which our various roles give rise. Thus a teacher ought to communicate clearly with her students in that it is part of the successful fulfillment of her role. According to Feldman, one of our roles, qua cognizers, is to form beliefs in response to evidence and on the basis of reflection. Like any role, the epistemic role can be played well or poorly. To say that our epistemic goal is to φ is to say that by φing, we would do what is required or recommended by the cognitive role we are playing.​[13]​
One might worry that the notions of epistemic goals and reasons occurring in E2, E4, and E5 are normative, that claims involving normative notions are not empirically confirmable, and that the empiricist is therefore committed to regarding these steps of the argument as unjustifiable or meaningless. For the reasons already discussed in connection with (c*), I expect the stance empiricist to construe these premises and other “second-order” empiricist positions as non-cognitive (as opposed to naturalistic). Just as Carnap interpreted sentences like EK and (c*) as proposals to use only empiricist languages, he could have interpreted E5 as the proposal to take up the empiricist stance. Perhaps van Fraassen could re-interpret these sentences as expressions of respect for his empirical stance. We could fill in the details of such an account by drawing on the rich literature on non-cognitive accounts of normativity.
	Is the teleological argument circular? No, for two reasons. First, it begins with a claim about evidence for E+, which, I have argued, is a descriptive and naturalistic thesis. The argument concludes that there is epistemic reason to adopt a non-cognitive stance. The argument can therefore hope to convince traditional empiricists to become stance empiricists. Second, a rationalist might, without denying E1, accept intuitions as justificatory—say, because they are subjectively consistent, intersubjectively corroborated, and treated as evidence in her current total theory (Bealer 1992, 109-110). Such a rationalist will deny E5. But once she is made aware of E1, and of the grounds for it discussed above, she accepts it and starts down the road to E5.​[14]​ Perhaps few rationalists will be so easily convinced. But the possibility of the agent just described is enough to show that the teleological argument does not beg the question against the rationalist.

7. The Teleological Argument and the Variety of Epistemic Goals
A defender of the arationality argument might respond to the teleological argument by advancing a conception of epistemic reason that would undermine E2. The teleological argument is so-called because it is compatible with virtually any view on which advancement of epistemic goals generates epistemic reasons. In my initial discussion, I used veritism—the thesis that having true beliefs and not having false beliefs are epistemic goals—to illustrate how empiricism advances our goals. But I could just as well have used any of veritism’s main teleological rivals, viz., the goals of understanding (Kvanvig 2003), wisdom (Kvanvig 2014), justification, or some combination of these and truth (Kvanvig 2014). In a nutshell, once it is granted that experience is our only source of information, any plausible conception of epistemology will favor stance empiricism over rationalism.
That is the idea in a nutshell; now I examine how it plays out for the various goals. I begin with wisdom and with Ryan’s (2014) discussion of four main conceptions thereof, viz., wisdom as humility, extensive knowledge, knowledge of living well, or accuracy. Here accuracy is understood as believing that one knows something if and only if this belief would be highly justified. As I discussed above, given E+, stance empiricism produces fewer false beliefs but no fewer true beliefs than its rationalist rivals. This means it better advances the goal of accuracy than does rationalism: if a rationalist methodology can license belief in many false, “first-order”, non-empirical propositions, then presumably it can do the same for false, “second-order” propositions about one’s knowledge of the false first-order propositions; appreciating that the stance licenses such a first-order belief will often suffice for the stance’s licensing such a second-order belief.
I concede that stance empiricism does not enjoy a similar advantage over rationalism with regard to wisdom understood as humility, extensive knowledge, or knowledge of living well. But it does not suffer a disadvantage either. Furthermore, none of these conceptions of wisdom is adequate by itself (Ryan 2014). Wisdom is a genus with each conception characterizing one of its species. By increasing one component or kind of wisdom without diminishing any of the others, stance empiricism would make us wiser tout court.
Next, consider epistemic justification as an epistemic goal. Feldman has developed the most detailed and influential formulation of this conception of epistemology. On Feldman’s view, “epistemological success amounts to having justified cognitive attitudes” (Feldman 2002, 381; quoted in Ahlstrom-Vij 2013, 338), where a cognitive attitude is justified just in case it conforms to the cognizer’s evidence.​[15]​ And he takes conformity with evidence to be a matter of cohering with the agent’s other cognitive attitudes. Feldman’s account of epistemic success also includes a temporal parameter: the only thing that can contribute to epistemic success at time t, he claims, is having justified cognitive states at t. But I want to set this parameter aside for now, in order to consider a possible version of the justification goal that, like the goals already considered, does not restrict the timing of the payoffs that ground epistemic reasons. I return to the full, temporally restricted version of Feldman’s view in the next section.
As I discussed above, E+ implies that any non-empirical belief is an uninformed “stab in the dark”, and therefore highly improbable. This means that non-empirical beliefs do not cohere with belief in E+. So if, as E1 claims, our evidence on balance supports E+, and if we believe it on this basis, then stance empiricism should generate a more coherent system of beliefs than rationalism. There is a kind of incoherence in believing that p on the sole basis of an a priori intuition and believing that E+; it is akin to believing that p and that one has no way of knowing whether p.
This argument does not apply to just any agent, regardless of their beliefs. Someone whose beliefs are internally coherent and exclude the deliverances of the relevant sciences might not be justified in believing E+, nor, therefore, would empiricism help them achieve the epistemic justification goal. But this limitation is not a serious drawback of the teleological argument. It is just an illustration of the platitude that no interesting argument is likely to rationally compel any possible agent.
The main alternative to Feldman’s coherentist conception of evidence is reliabilism, i.e., the thesis that a belief is epistemically justified just in case a reliable process of belief formation produced it. Such a reliabilist construal of the justification goal is just as amenable as coherentism to the teleological argument: together with E+, it straightforwardly entails that stance empiricism advances the epistemic goal.
There are possible accounts of the justification goal that would support rationalism.​[16]​ However, it is doubtful that any of them are consistent with E+. For example, one could maintain that direct acquaintance with an item x’s being F is evidence that x is F and that a priori intuition directly acquaints us with facts of this kind. But this view of a priori intuition conflicts with E+. 
Empiricism’s recently noted contributions to falsity avoidance and justification bring with them the further advantage of promoting the understanding goal. To understand some subject matter, one must be correct about it, and so a stance that allows us to avoid falsity or to have more coherent belief systems should give us more or better understanding. To flesh out this line of thought, I will need a more detailed account of understanding, and for this purpose, I appeal to Kvanvig’s (2003). On this view propositional understanding is a species of knowledge that “requires the grasping of explanatory and other coherence-making relationships in a large body of information” (Kvanvig 2003, 192). Since, as I recently pointed out, beliefs that are based on a priori intuition alone do not cohere with E+, believing in them will reduce the coherence of the bodies of information to which they belong—again, for those who accept the reliability of the biosocial sciences that have, by hypothesis, established E+.

8. Epistemic Tradeoffs
In the previous section, I argued that several goals that are widely regarded as epistemic validate the teleological argument’s contention that stance empiricism is likely to further epistemic goals. The goals I considered are all diachronic, by which I mean that an event could advance one’s pursuit of them by increasing the likelihood of, or by bringing about, a future payoff. Some philosophers deny that we have diachronic epistemic goals at all, and insist instead that epistemic goals are synchronic, i.e., that epistemic goals make reference only to the immediate present. Feldman (2000, 685) is a well-known synchronist. He asserts that the best (and only) way to pursue the epistemic goal is, for any proposition p towards which one has some doxastic attitude at time t, to believe p at t if and only if p is supported by one’s evidence at t. On this view, that φ-ing on Monday would give one truer beliefs on Tuesday gives one no epistemic reason to φ on Monday.
One might hope to undermine the teleological argument by appealing to synchronism in the following way. Non-cognitive states, like those included in stance empiricism, cannot themselves be epistemically valuable. Any putatively “epistemic” payoffs they yield—abandonment of a false belief, e.g.—will accrue at a later time, after psychological processes unfold. But given synchronism, such future “payoffs” do not presently contribute to one’s pursuit of one’s epistemic goal. Therefore, there can be no epistemic reason in the present to enter into a non-cognitive state in the present. For instance, Kraskin adopts stance empiricism at a point in his life when he believes in telepathy, despite a total lack of evidence for its existence. Then, after spending a day thinking through the implications of the stance, he ceases to believe in telepathy. This cessation of an unsupported belief is one of the stance’s payoffs for Kraskin. However, since the payoff does not occur at the instant he adopted the stance, it does not constitute a specifically epistemic payoff according to synchronism.
This synchronist objection is vulnerable to two responses. First, it assumes that non-cognitive states have no instantaneous epistemic payoffs, and this in turn makes controversial assumptions about cognitive states. Many functionalists say, plausibly, that to believe is to meet conditions like the following:
[B1] Reflection on propositions (e.g., [Q] and [if Q then P]) from which P straightforwardly follows, if one believes those propositions, typically causes the belief that P.
[B2] Believing that P, in conditions favoring sincere expression of that belief, will typically lead to an assertion of P. (Schwitzgebel 2015)
In the example I just discussed, I supposed that Kraskin needed to spend a day adjusting to empiricism before he ceased to believe in telepathy. But notice that, according to B1 and B2, we do not need to spend time deducing conclusions in order to acquire new beliefs. We only need to meet new counterfactual conditions. And the adoption of a non-cognitive state could instantaneously make someone meet such conditions. Suppose that John-Paul believes (i) that heathens will be punished in Hell and (ii) that Hugo is a heathen; and furthermore, were he to reflect on propositions (i) and (ii), he would likely infer (iii) that Hugo will be punished in Hell, and so he believes this proposition too. Then he becomes a stance empiricist. At that very instant, he acquires a new disposition: for any proposition p, if asked whether p is true, John-Paul considers whether p is empirically confirmable, and if he concludes that it is not, he withholds belief from p. This disposition instantaneously alters John-Paul’s counterfactual properties, so that reflection on (i) and (ii) would no longer cause him to believe (iii); (iii) is not empirically confirmable, so his new disposition makes him withhold belief from it. In this way, adopting stance empiricism gives him an instantaneous epistemic payoff.
Second, the primary arguments for synchronism are invalid. We can see this by considering that of Foley, an influential synchronist:
[t]he epistemic goal is not a goal that is concerned with believing propositions that will serve one well with respect to one’s believing truths in a few years or in a few weeks or even in a few moments (since again it might be the case that believing a falsehood, even a proposition that is obviously false, would serve this concern). (Foley 1987, 8)
Here Foley argues that, since diachronic conceptions of veritism license problematic tradeoffs, the epistemic goal must be synchronic. The tradeoffs are analogous to those figuring in well-known objections to moral consequentialism: just as it is morally wrong to non-consensually remove five of a person’s organs in order to save five other people, so it is epistemically wrong to believe one obvious falsehood in order to later avoid five others.
The first thing to note is that, as Berker (2013) shows, the tradeoff problem comes from thinking of epistemic reason as wholly teleological, not from thinking of it as diachronic. As I argued above, and as Berker (2013) argues on different grounds, a mental state can instantaneously generate various epistemic payoffs. When an obviously false belief does this, synchronic teleological conceptions will agree with diachronic conceptions in instructing us to adopt it. So the tradeoff problem is teleology’s problem, and not diachronism’s specifically. But this does not help the teleological argument’s appeal to epistemic teleology.
The empiricist could respond here that wholly teleological conceptions need not license problematic epistemic tradeoffs. Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn (2014) take this line. Alternatively, the empiricist could point out that E2 does not presuppose a wholly teleological conception, and that it is specifically such conceptions that are vulnerable to tradeoff problems. E2 holds that a stance’s producing good epistemic consequences is an epistemic reason to adopt it. But this does not presuppose what I have been calling a wholly teleological conception of epistemic reason, i.e., a conception on which all epistemic reasons derive from contributions to goals; the weaker thesis that contributing to epistemic goals is one source of prima facie epistemic reasons would suffice for E2. The latter weaker thesis is compatible with there being both teleological and non-teleological epistemic reasons, with the latter trumping the former in the problematic tradeoff cases. 
The kind of mixed account just alluded to, which would contain both teleological and non-teleological elements, is not an ad hoc response to tradeoff problems. In moral philosophy, such mixed accounts are the primary alternatives to pure teleology. We see this most clearly in the case of moral pluralism and Ross’s moral philosophy. But even Kant, who is perhaps the most extreme critic of pure teleology in ethics, incorporates goal-based norms: his categorical imperative is supposed to generate a duty to adopt the maxim, “I will help others” (Kant 1997, 4:423), which is naturally interpreted as the adoption of a goal. Although analogously mixed theories have not yet to my knowledge been developed in epistemology, given the latter’s deep parallels with ethics (Berker 2013), these analogues are worth exploring.

9. Epistemic Reason and Epistemic Justification
Some proponents of the arationality argument believe, and several readers of this essay have entertained the notion, that to have an epistemic reason to φ is just to be epistemically justified in φing, where φing is epistemically justified only if it is likely true given the evidence. I call this the justified belief conception of epistemic reason. Since non-cognitive states are not truth-apt, they cannot be epistemically justified in this sense, and therefore, on this conception, cannot be objects of epistemic reason. Rather, on this view, epistemic reason is concerned with cognitive states exclusively.​[17]​ It is pragmatic reason that is said to govern stance adoption.
I have argued that most existing accounts on which the epistemic goal is justification, e.g., Foley’s and Feldman’s, are not accounts of this kind, as their formulations allow for non-cognitive states that advance the epistemic goal instantaneously upon adoption. But perhaps there is some way of formulating the epistemic goal that would entail that only present, justified beliefs can advance it. If all else fails, one could resort to brute stipulation.
An alternative to tailoring the epistemic goal to the justified belief conception is to deny that advancing epistemic goals in and of itself produces epistemic reasons. One could then accept veritism, e.g., while denying that stance empiricism’s contribution to falsity-avoidance is an epistemic reason to take up the stance. Boucher seems to express this view in the following passage:
[e]ven if the benefits of stances are epistemic, we are still dealing with pragmatic justification inasmuch as the stance is justified in terms of the benefits of adopting it. (Suppose that a scientist’s belief that she is a genius increases her chances of doing good scientific work. The belief has epistemic payoff, but it is still pragmatically, not epistemically justified.) (Boucher 2014, 2319) 
Examples like this one constitute one of the primary arguments for the justified belief conception.​[18]​ It is assumed that the scientist’s belief’s epistemic payoffs do not yield an epistemic reason for it. One route from this assumption to the justified belief conception is to then assume that there is no principled demarcation of epistemic reason that excludes such a belief without at the same time restricting epistemic reason to epistemic justification. The justified belief conception, the thought goes, is the only way to account for the scientist’s lacking epistemic reason to believe in her own genius.
	Call Boucher’s scientist ‘Vizzina’ and the content of her belief ‘G’. My first concern about this use of the example is that it equivocates on the term ‘justification’. The justified belief conception uses the term in the specific, technical sense of twentieth century epistemology, viz., in the sense of likely true given the evidence. However, this concept must be carefully distinguished from that of an epistemic reason. Equating the two concepts would trivially settle the question whether there could be epistemic reason (or, relatedly, an epistemic duty) to, e.g., gather evidence (Hall and Johnson 1998) or to critically reflect (Kim 1994), as neither of these activities are truth-apt. But these questions are not trivial; or, at least, the claim that they are cannot be assumed without argument.​[19]​
If there are two distinct but legitimate concepts here—those of epistemic reason and epistemic justification—then the same circumstance might give Vizzina an epistemic reason to believe G without epistemically justifying this belief. So we cannot infer that the belief’s epistemic payoffs provide no epistemic reason for it from the fact that these payoffs do not epistemically justify it.
	Still, one might grant the distinction between epistemic reason and justification and still maintain that Vizzina has no epistemic reason to believe G.​[20]​ Above, I proposed an abductive argument from this assessment of the case to the justified belief conception. I will now show that this argument fails, as there is a better explanation of Vizzina’s lack of a reason to believe G. This better explanation is—for lack of a term that is not already taken—functionism, i.e., the thesis that if one’s
	φing would mean one (probably) does better in sense K, and 
	φing is an activity that may itself be K-valuable, or which functions as a rule regulating an activity that may itself be K-valuable,
then one has a prima facie K-reason to φ.​[21]​ Applied to epistemic reason, the thesis says that if φing functions to regulate belief or inquiry—activities which, when done right, are themselves epistemically valuable—and would (probably) mean that one believes or inquires better, epistemically speaking, then one has epistemic reason to φ.
Functionism is a theory of which kinds of activity are subject to which kinds of reason. It is not an account of epistemic value, and is neutral between a wide range of theories thereof. Hall and Johnson (1998) can claim, consistently with functionism, that believing truths and not believing falsehoods is what is epistemically valuable, and that, since gathering evidence functions to produce more value of this kind, we have epistemic reason to gather evidence. (But notice that, even given this veritist conception of epistemic value, functionism does not posit an epistemic reason to go for a walk, even if we would thereby acquire more evidence and truer beliefs. This is because walking does not function to regulate belief.) At the same time, Feldman (2000) can claim, equally consistently with functionism, that epistemic value is believing reasonably based on current evidence, and that, since gathering more evidence does not yield more of this kind of value, we have no epistemic reason to do so.
Returning to the example of Vizzina, functionism does not posit an epistemic reason for her to believe G because the belief does not function to regulate inquiry. The belief might initiate a sequence of mental events leading to the use of a rule that does; it might increase Vizzina’s self-confidence, which in turn might make her respond to data of kind K in a new, rule-governed way. But this is not for the belief or the increased self-confidence themselves to be instances of a rule functioning to guide inquiry; rather, if Vizzina follows a rule prescribing certain uses of K data, this rule-following is another link in the causal chain of mental events, subsequent to the belief and increased self-confidence. But on the functionist account, it is specifically the act of following the rule that is supported by epistemic reason.
So Boucher’s example of Vizzina does not count in favor of the justified belief conception over functionism. Furthermore, functionism has a significant advantage over the justified belief conception. An inference rule is not a proposition, but is rather a rule governing transitions between propositions. This means that inferences are not truth-apt, and so are not subject to the kind of epistemic justification treated of in the justified belief conception. But inferences are paradigmatically epistemic activities; it is crucial that we be able to epistemically evaluate them. To see this, suppose that I, with my pedestrian beliefs and acceptance of classical logical principles and inference rules, suddenly accept the inference rules implicitly defining the connective ‘TONK’, viz.
	from ‘p’ infer ‘pTONKq’, and
	from ‘pTONKq’ infer ‘q’,
and that I follow these rules to infer that grass is green from the premise that Clinton is a lizard. The justified belief conception is committed to denying that I had epistemic reason not to infer this conclusion by means of the TONK rules and epistemic reason not to accept TONK’s inference rules in the first place.​[22]​
Finally, functionism demarcates epistemic reason in a principled way: it is eminently reasonable to treat states or processes whose function is to regulate inquiry as subject to epistemic norms. This is just to evaluate a policy based on its success in achieving its function. Functionism is not the product of post hoc gerrymandering.
I conclude that the objection to the teleological argument from the justified belief conception is unsound. But we can go further: functionism is preferable to this conception and positively supports the relevant step of the teleological argument, i.e., the move from stance empiricism’s advancing epistemic goals to there being epistemic reason for it. Stances are exactly the kind of thing that, according to functionism, can be recommended by epistemic reasons. As I have argued, stances are sets of mental states whose rules or contents function to regulate inquiry. And if stances are subject to epistemic reason, there is a strong presumption that there are such reasons on behalf of stances that advance epistemic goals. As the teleological argument shows, this is the case for stance empiricism.

10. Van Fraassen’s Objection to E+
Another objection to the teleological argument comes from van Fraassen himself. He argues that E+ lacks empirical content, and is therefore meaningless or unjustifiable according to the empiricism it is supposed to motivate. This would undermine E1.
Van Fraassen’s (1995) objection to E+ relies on a thought experiment in which researchers attempt to empirically test the thesis. In the experiment, subjects are placed in sensory deprivation tanks for a set duration. Their knowledge when they exit the tanks is then compared with their knowledge when they entered them. Surprisingly, one experimental subject, Peter, comes to know new things about elephants while inside the tank. When asked how he acquired this knowledge, he says that he daydreamed about elephants and came to believe the contents of the dreams. Even more surprisingly, Peter acquires more daydream-induced beliefs about the outside world and each one is found to be true.
It is tempting to think that Peter’s acquiring true beliefs in this non-sensory way disconfirms E+. For it seems that Peter’s daydreams convey reliable information. But van Fraassen denies this. He maintains that “[i]f we think that Peter gains new information in a way akin to observation… we should be willing to enter [the content of Peter’s daydream reports] as data” (1995, 76). However, van Fraassen asserts, scientists would not enter the content of Peter’s daydream reports (e.g., that Jumbo the elephant recognized himself in a mirror) under the heading ‘data’. Rather, they would enter Peter’s having the daydream (e.g., that Peter daydreamed that Jumbo recognized himself in a mirror). Given the known reliability of Peter’s daydreams, they could then infer the truth of the contents of the dream. In this way, Peter is treated as a kind of reliable, organic instrument for detecting facts.
Even if we grant van Fraassen’s assessment of the thought experiment, it still does not establish the intended conclusion that E+ lacks empirical content. First, we should distinguish E+’s status for the scientific community from its status for Peter. Van Fraassen points out that the scientific community would not abandon E+ on the basis of the experiment. However, it seems reasonable for Peter to treat his daydreaming as a non-sensory source of information and for this reason reject E+.
Second, and more importantly, the experiment involving Peter fails to disconfirm E+ not because E+ is immune to disconfirmation, but because Peter’s daydreams fail to meet two desiderata for scientific data—desiderata that they do meet in variations on the thought experiment. One such desideratum is intersubjectivity: we expect any given scientific datum to be accessible to the broader scientific community. But Peter’s daydreams are private episodes in that other agents can only infer their occurrences and contents on the basis of more direct observations—of his reports of his daydreams, e.g. A second desideratum of scientific data is an understanding of the mechanism or process by which they are apprehended.​[23]​ Thus in the case of visual perception, we have some understanding—even if incomplete—of how information about our environment is conveyed through the eyes and neural pathways to the brain, and of how this process grounds the scientist’s reaction to the information. But, in van Fraassen’s example, the reliability of Peter’s daydreams is, as far as we know, a complete mystery.​[24]​
Given these desiderata of scientific data, I add the following stipulations to van Fraassen’s thought experiment:
a.	Everyone can acquire true beliefs through the same reliable daydreaming process as Peter;
b.	When a daydream is of the reliable variety, the daydreamer’s complexion becomes a distinctive teal;
c.	When a person is having a reliable daydream, others can induce a reliable daydream with the same content by simply deciding to do so; and
d.	The scientific community knows (a), (b), and (c), and understands the biophysical mechanisms underlying them.
(a), (b), and (c) help the daydreams meet the intersubjectivity desideratum on scientific data, while (d) ensures that they meet the understanding desideratum. It seems to me that the scientific community in the thought experiment, so revised, should treat the deliverances of the reliable daydreams as data. This would count as empirical disconfirmation of E+.
Do these adjustments to van Fraassen’s example make the reliable daydreams into a new kind of experience that E+ is meant to encompass? Not according to the spirit of E+, which is intended to assert that perceptual experiences are the only source of information about the external environment. But perceptual experiences and daydreams—including those of the imagined reliable variety—differ dramatically in their phenomenologies and, we may suppose, their physiological bases. Reliable daydreams, I stipulate, involve some kind of direct impinging on the brain, without the mediation of receptors or neural pathways. Perhaps, e.g., scientists discover an underlying cause that accounts for a nomologically necessary correlation between its being the case that p and reliable daydreams that p.
Van Fraassen could dig in his heels and insist that even in the amended thought experiment, the daydreams are not data. But what would be the point of restricting the notion of a datum in this way? Such a limitation on the notion is neither straightforwardly pre-theoretically compelling nor pragmatically or epistemically advantageous.
There is another reason to count reliable daydreams as data in the revised thought experiment. The teleological argument accounts for the primacy of experience in stance empiricism. Since he does not appeal to E+ for this purpose, van Fraassen needs a different account. Cartwright (2007) offers a candidate for this purpose. She argues that the observable should occupy a privileged position in inquiry in part because “we are creatures bound in a world of sensation and, unlike other facts about us, this is not a matter of choice” (2007, 37). She fleshes out this idea in the following gloss on some remarks by van Fraassen:
van Fraassen and I talked long ago about microbes. What I recall he said to me is something like this: What is it that in the end you care about? Not the invisible microbe but rather the stomach-ache you might feel. So long as you’ve got it right about that—and all the other sensations that the microbe might produce—what more can you really mind about?​[25]​ (Cartwright 2007, 38)
	But now consider that the people in the revised thought experiment are not “bound in a world of sensation” alone; rather they are bound in a world that includes in addition reliable daydreams. To whatever extent they care about, say, a visual experience indicating the presence of unobservable microbes of a given kind, they should care equally about a reliable daydream that indicates the same. And if this kind of care accounts for the special epistemic status of perceptual experience, then reliable daydreams should enjoy the same status in the revised thought experiment.

11. Conclusion
In response to the worry that empiricism is meaningless or unjustifiable by its own lights, Carnap and van Fraassen have proposed to construe empiricism as a stance containing non-cognitive attitudes. A common objection to this move is to argue that stances, unlike beliefs, are not subject to epistemic reason. If the objection is cogent, then stance empiricism is on an epistemic par with superstition.
In defense of stance empiricism, I offered a “teleological” argument, which, in rough outline, says that we know that experience is our only reliable source of information, that stance empiricism is therefore likely to advance an epistemic goal, and that this constitutes an epistemic reason to be a stance empiricist. I then considered three lines of objection to this argument, both of which I found wanting. The first holds that the conception of epistemic reason I have presupposed, whether through diachronism or teleology, licenses problematic epistemic tradeoffs. I found that the only conception of epistemic reason that would validate the objection is one that accords goals no epistemic role at all. And while Berker has recently raised powerful objections to wholly teleological theories of epistemic reason, nothing he has said suggests that goals are not a source of epistemic reasons. Furthermore, given the important parallels between epistemology and ethics, a conception that is completely devoid of goals would be belied by the teleological components of the main alternatives to pure teleology in ethics. The second objection holds that to be the object of an epistemic reason is just to be epistemically justified, with cognitive states holding a monopoly on epistemic justification. In response, I argued that the identity of epistemic justification and reason cannot be assumed without argument and that it conflicts with the plausible assumption that inferences are subject to epistemic reason. The third objection I considered is van Fraassen’s contention that the premise E+—that experience is our only source of information—is empirically meaningless and therefore unavailable to empiricists. I modified van Fraassen’s thought experiment so that within it, E+ is empirically disconfirmed and therefore empirically meaningful.
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^1	  For example, I will not address general worries about non-cognitive analyses of normative discourse, such as the worry, first raised by Geach (1960), that such analyses cannot account for non-assertoric predications of normative terms. I will also presuppose a distinction between empirical and non-empirical propositions. Finally, I ignore questions about the adequacy of empiricist treatments of certain kinds of knowledge, such as knowledge of one’s own mind, mathematics, and methodologically basic principles or rules like induction or modus ponens.
^2	  Kelly (2003) and Lockard (2013) point out what I see as the main problem with such analyses. It is that the leading instrumentalist, naturalistic analysans of empiricist epistemological claims are relativized to agents’ goals and preferences in ways that the analysanda are not.
^3	  It seems to me that at this point, the objector must saddle the empiricist with an analysis of necessity as analyticity. For the claim that EK is necessary is less obviously false than the claim that it is analytic. Thanks to Tom Vinci for discussion of this point.
^4	  Andrew Fenton pointed out to me the need for such elaboration.
^5	  It is often held that the project of defining such a criterion has failed decisively. I am persuaded by Justus (2014) that the primary arguments for this view are not cogent. Furthermore, the kinds of significance criteria that have been refuted in the past are highly general—they are defined for an arbitrary language L. But they do not need to be. Rather, as Goldfarb and Ricketts (1992, 74-75) argue, we can delineate the empiricist languages on a “case-by-case” basis, i.e., immanently for particular languages. This approach is likely to avoid the cycle of punctures and patches that significance criteria have been stuck in.
^6	  To be distinguished from irrational, i.e., contrary to epistemic reason.
^7	  Chakravartty couches his discussion in terms of van Fraassen’s thin conception of rational belief, which is a matter of “logical consistency and probabilistic coherence” (Chakravartty 2004, 180). But nothing in Chakravartty’s (2004) argument turns on this conception.This is in contrast with Chakravartty (2011). There he points out that van Fraassen’s conception of rationality is in general too thin to decide between rival stances: many radically different stances are logically consistent and probabilistically coherent, and so the work of deciding between them falls on non-cognitive values. I will be working with a thicker conception of epistemic reason, one on which advancing an epistemic goal furnishes an epistemic reason, at least for epistemic stances.
^8	  Carnap regarded epistemology as an obscure mixture of psychology and logic, whose notions were explicanda in need of explication. I take ‘theoretical’, as he uses it, to be the resulting explicatum, which he discusses in his (1936).
^9	  An anonymous referee noted that one could use E1 to argue for traditional empiricism. This does not pose any problem in the present context since I am not trying to show that stance empiricism is preferable to traditional empiricism. The idea is to recruit E1 into the service of a normative empiricism that does not succumb to a self-defeat objection.
^10	  Andrew Fenton pointed this out to me.
^11	  Isaac Saney suggested a construal along these lines.
^12	  David’s (2014) more sophisticated version of this “veritist” view adds that we should non-accidentally believe interesting truths and not believe falsehoods. Nothing in my discussion will depend on these kinds of nuances.
^13	  An important advantage of this role conception of epistemic oughts is that it explains how it can be that one ought to believe a given proposition even if one cannot voluntarily do so. Just as a teacher who is so averse to the theory of evolution by natural selection that he cannot voluntarily bring himself to teach it ought to do so nonetheless, so we, qua cognizers, should believe things that we cannot. For further discussion of the denial of the epistemic “ought implies can” principle, see Feldman (2000, 674).
^14	  The agent described here does not necessarily take experience to be a more basic source of justification than intuition and therefore reject intuition as a source of evidence when so viewing it conflicts with what experience tells her. Rather, she rejects intuition as a source of justification because she cannot explain, in terms of any putative source of justification, why intuition should be reliable; even intuition-based methods provide no satisfactory explanation of their own reliability (cf. Bealer (1992, 116)).
^15	  Feldman sees justification as a more plausible epistemic goal than truth because, intuitively, believing truly against all evidence is not a way to achieve epistemic success.
^16	  Tyler Hildebrand pointed this out to me.
^17	  An anonymous referee suggested that the teleological argument begs the question against proponents of the arationality argument generally, as the justified belief conception is part of the arationality argument per se. However, we have seen that Chakravartty (2004) allows, contrary to the justified belief conception, that epistemic rationality by proxy is a genuine notion of epistemic rationality. Moreover, there is no textual evidence that, with the exception of Boucher (2014), the other proponents of the arationality argument cited accept the justified belief conception. 
^18	  Duncan MacIntosh raised with me the example of a healthy diet that improves cognitive functioning, but that is, he suggested, not the object of an epistemic reason.
^19	  Boucher’s contention that “if the benefits of stances are epistemic, we are still dealing with pragmatic justification inasmuch as the stance is justified in terms of the benefits of adopting it” might be taken as a self-standing assertion, as opposed to itself following abductively from its explanation of the Vizzina case. I see such an assertion as in need of justification and not as an appropriate starting point for theorizing. Moreover, it is vulnerable to my objection to the justified belief conception, discussed below.
^20	  I note that I am unaware of any advantages of such a view.
^21	  Functionism states a sufficient but not a necessary condition on having a kind of reason to do something. This is by design: I find it doubtful that all actions that are subject to moral reasons meet the stated condition.
^22	  Inference rules and axioms are interchangeable to a certain extent. But this does not mean that epistemic reasons for or against uses of inference rules are reducible to epistemic reasons for or against beliefs. There is an ineliminable inferential component in any systematic formulation of one’s knowledge: we cannot reason with axioms alone, but need inference rules to get from axioms to theorems.
^23	  Such an understanding is, I am suggesting, a desideratum. I doubt that it is a requirement.
^24	  I have not here advocated an account of observation that rules out sense-data theories of perception. Rather, my claim is that intersubjective observations are necessary for science as a social activity. For example, experimental results can be reproduced by distinct research teams only if these results are intersubjectively observable. For all I have said, sense-data may provide an adequate basis for one’s own private theory.
^25	  Van Fraassen seems to endorse Cartwright’s argument, though his remarks on it are cagey:we may care about things above and beyond the effects they could have in our experience, and want to arrive at some beliefs about them independently of how they affect what we will or can observe. But Cartwright sees a dividing line there, and adds to the above ‘and, unlike other facts about us, this is not a matter of choice.’ At this point she makes contact, it seems to me, with my classification of further beliefs in what our accepted theories say, as rationally permissible but supererogatory as far as the scientific enterprise is concerned. (van Fraassen 2007, 344)
